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Consciousness, with its irreducible subjective character, was almost exclusively a philosophical topic
until relatively recently. Today, however, the problem of explaining the felt quality of experience has
also become relevant to science and engineering, including robotics andAI: “What would we have to
build into a robot so that it really felt the touch of a finger, the redness of red, or the hurt of a pain?”
(O’Regan, 2014, p. 23). Yet a practical response still requires an adequate theory of consciousness,
which brings us back to the hard problem: how canwe account, from a scientific point of view, for the
phenomenological character of experience? Over a decade ago, O’Regan and Noë (2001) proposed
a new approach to these questions, the so-called sensorimotor approach to perceptual experience.
How far has this approach come and what are its outstanding challenges? The volumeContemporary
Sensorimotor Theory, edited by Bishop and Martin, takes stock of the current state of the field.
The book starts with Bishop andMartin (2014) presenting different facets of sensorimotor theory,
highlighting, for example, that O’Regan (2011) and Noë (2004) ended up developing different
ideas concerning the applicability of the theory to robots: a positive account appealing to higher-
order cognitive capacities versus a skeptical stance citing the necessity of life for mind, respectively.
Ambiguous labeling does not help the current situation. According to Hutto and Myin (2013), the
sensorimotor approach of O’Regan and Noë (2001) is also “enactive,” a label which Noë (2004)
himself began to adopt, but from which Pascal and O’Regan (2008) distanced themselves. In
fact, several overlapping approaches may be distinguished in addition to the classic sensorimotor
approach, including sensorimotor enactivism (Varela et al., 1991; Noë, 2004), which turned into
autopoietic enactivism (Thompson, 2005, 2007; Noë, 2009; Froese and Di Paolo, 2011), and which
is distinguished from radical enactivism by Hutto and Myin (2013). The book’s contributions range
over all of them.
Noë did not contribute to this volume, but his absence is compensated by other submissions.
Pepper (2014) points out some conceptual difficulties with Noë’s theory of perception, which could
be resolved withMerleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body schema and sedimentation.Wadham
(2014) claims that Noë’s theory implies the invisibility of perspectival properties, which requires a
revision of his theory of perspectival content.
O’Regan (2014) reports on his sensorimotor approach. He proposes that “experiencing a sen-
sation involves being engaged in sensorimotor interaction” but that “being conscious of some-
thing [: : :] requires appeal to a form of ‘higher-order’ cognitive access” (p. 34). In contrast,
Rainey (2014) argues that consciousness is non-conceptual while experience is conceptual,
and that consciousness is, therefore, the enabling ground for the possibility of experience.
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Scarinzi (2014) points out difficulties faced by O’Regan’s
approach, characterized as “semi-enactive,” that could be resolved
by paying closer attention to the lived body, as done by autopoietic
enactivism (Thompson, 2007). Paine (2014) also critically
examines O’Regan’s proposal, evaluating how Heideggerian
phenomenology may help his ideas about robot consciousness
to evade Dreyfus (2007) objections against AI. Paine also notes
that O’Regan leaves out any role for emotion.
This concern is shared by Parthemore (2014), who proposes
to extend sensorimotor theory by taking into account emotional
affect and the somatosensory system, and to, thereby, turn it into a
better theory of concepts. Other authors also propose extensions.
Lyon (2014) explores the implications of extending sensorimotor
theory beyond vision and touch, in particular to audition. Rucin-
ska (2014) extends sensorimotor theory to explain basic forms
of pretense. Cowley (2014) considers how language extends the
sensorimotor domain.
There is also an unresolved tension about the role of infor-
mational content in the generation of perceptual consciousness
in the book. Some authors explore the qualitative differences
between types of sensations in terms of information processing
(Gamez, 2014), while others advocate abandoning the appeal to
informational content altogether (Loughlin, 2014). One problem
with a non-representational approach is to explain the experience
of imaginary things. Rucinska (2014) account of “seeing-as” may
help in developing a solution.
To sum up, this volume invites us to refine our notions of
consciousness and experience on the basis of the close rela-
tionship between action and perception. However, more work
needs to be done to compare and contrast the distinct kinds of
sensorimotor/enactive theories. In the context of AI and robotics,
for example, we need to clearly distinguish between sensorimotor
and autopoietic enactivism. The popularity of the sensorimotor
approach is largely explained by its applicability to the design
of AI and robotics (e.g., Hoffmann, 2014; Lyon, 2014), and by
O’Regan’s (2014) claim that it could lead to genuine examples of
conscious machines. But this appeal is counterbalanced by a set of
philosophical difficulties (Bishop and Martin, 2014), including a
lack of clear definitions as to what it means to be an agent or to
perform an action (Thompson, 2005).
Autopoietic enactivism, on the other hand, gives us amore solid
conceptual foundation of subjectivity by drawing from biological
embodiment and from the phenomenological tradition, but not
without unfortunate implications for research in AI and robotics
(Froese and Ziemke, 2009). Although dynamical systems models
of cognition can help us to formally define different notions
of sensorimotor contingency (Buhrmann et al., 2013), they are
forced to abstract away the autopoietic foundations of agency. Of
course, even on this view, research in robotics and the sensori-
motor approach continue to form a productive relationship. Yet
investigating the hard problem of perceptual experience requires
working directly with the first-person perspective. In accordance
with the contribution by Gibbs and Devlin (2014), we propose
that we can keep the advantages of a synthetic methodology by
shifting emphasis from autonomous robotics to human–computer
interfaces (Froese et al., 2012). As Gillies and Kleinsmith (2014)
propose, such an embodied and enactive approach to design-
ing human–computer interfaces opens up new opportunities for
exploringmore intuitive interfaces that directly tap into our bodily
capacities for perceptual consciousness.
REFERENCES
Bishop, J.M., andMartin, A. O. (2014). “Contemporary sensorimotor theory: a brief
introduction,” in Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory, eds J. M. Bishop and A. O.
Martin (Switzerland: Springer), 1–22.
Buhrmann, T., Di Paolo, E. A., and Barandiaran, X. (2013). A dynamical systems
account of sensorimotor contingencies. Front. Psychol. 4:285. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.
2013.00285
Cowley, S. J. (2014). “Human language and sensorimotor contingency,” in Contem-
porary Sensorimotor Theory, eds J. M. Bishop and A. O. Martin (Switzerland:
Springer), 235–252.
Dreyfus, H. L. (2007). Why Heideggerian AI failed and how fixing it would
require making it more Heideggerian. Philos. Psychol. 20, 247–268. doi:10.1080/
09515080701239510
Froese, T., and Di Paolo, E. A. (2011). The enactive approach: theoretical
sketches from cell to society. Pragmat. Cogn. 19, 1–36. doi:10.1075/pc.19.1.
01fro
Froese, T., Suzuki, K., Ogai, Y., and Ikegami, T. (2012). Using human-computer
interfaces to investigate ‘mind-as-it-could-be’ from the first-person perspective.
Cogn. Comput. 4, 365–382. doi:10.1007/s12559-012-9153-4
Froese, T., and Ziemke, T. (2009). Enactive artificial intelligence: investigating the
systemic organization of life and mind. Artif. Intell. 173, 466–500. doi:10.1016/j.
artint.2008.12.001
Gamez, D. (2014). “Conscious sensation, conscious perception and sensorimotor
theories of consciousness,” in Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory, eds J. M.
Bishop and A. O. Martin (Switzerland: Springer), 159–174.
Gibbs, J. K., and Devlin, K. (2014). “Investigating sensorimotor contingencies in the
enactive interface,” in Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory, eds J. M. Bishop and
A. O. Martin (Switzerland: Springer), 189–200.
Gillies, M., and Kleinsmith, A. (2014). “Non-representational interaction design,”
in Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory, eds J. M. Bishop and A. O. Martin
(Switzerland: Springer), 201–208.
Hoffmann, M. (2014). “Minimally cognitive robotics: body schema, forward mod-
els, and sensorimotor contingencies in a quadruped machine,” in Contemporary
Sensorimotor Theory, eds J. M. Bishop and A. O. Martin (Switzerland: Springer),
209–233.
Hutto, D. D., and Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without
Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Loughlin, V. (2014). “Sensorimotor knowledge and the radical alternative,” in Con-
temporary Sensorimotor Theory, eds J. M. Bishop and A. O.Martin (Switzerland:
Springer), 105–116.
Lyon, C. (2014). “Beyond vision: extending the scope of a sensorimotor account of
perception,” in Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory, eds J. M. Bishop and A. O.
Martin (Switzerland: Springer), 127–136.
Noë, A. (2004). Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Noë, A. (2009). Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons
from the Biology of Consciousness. New York, NY: Hill and Wang.
O’Regan, J. K. (2011).Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of
Consciousness. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
O’Regan, J. K. (2014). “The explanatory status of the sensorimotor approach to
phenomenal consciousness, and its appeal to cognition,” in Contemporary Sen-
sorimotor Theory, eds J. M. Bishop and A. O. Martin (Switzerland: Springer),
23–35.
O’Regan, J. K., and Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual
consciousness. Behav. Brain Sci. 24, 883–917. doi:10.1017/S0140525X01000115
Paine, R. (2014). “Heideggerian credentials? O’Regan’s sensorimotor approach to
perception and robots that feel,” in Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory, eds J.
M. Bishop and A. O. Martin (Switzerland: Springer), 37–52.
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org October 2015 | Volume 2 | Article 262
Froese and Sierra Book review: Contemporary sensorimotor theory
Parthemore, J. (2014). “From a sensorimotor to a sensorimotor++ account of
embodied conceptual cognition,” in Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory, eds J.
M. Bishop and A. O. Martin (Switzerland: Springer), 137–158.
Pascal, F., and O’Regan, J. K. (2008). Commentary on Mossio and Taraborelli: is
the enactive approach really sensorimotor? Conscious. Cogn. 17, 1341–1342.
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.06.013
Pepper, K. (2014). “The phenomenology of sensorimotor understanding,” in Con-
temporary Sensorimotor Theory, eds J. M. Bishop and A. O.Martin (Switzerland:
Springer), 53–65.
Rainey, S. (2014). “Experience and consciousness: concepts from the outside in,”
in Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory, eds J. M. Bishop and A. O. Martin
(Switzerland: Springer), 83–104.
Rucinska, Z. (2014). “Basic pretending as sensorimotor engagement? Lessons from
sensorimotor theory for the debate on pretence,” in Contemporary Sensori-
motor Theory, eds J. M. Bishop and A. O. Martin (Switzerland: Springer),
175–187.
Scarinzi, A. (2014). “How enactive is the dynamic sensorimotor account of raw
feel? Discussing some insights from phenomenology and the cognitive sciences,”
in Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory, eds J. M. Bishop and A. O. Martin
(Switzerland: Springer), 67–81.
Thompson, E. (2005). Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to
experience. Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 4, 407–427. doi:10.1007/s11097-005-9003-x
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of
Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., and Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive
Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wadham, J. (2014). “The problem of invisible content,” in Contemporary Senso-
rimotor Theory, eds J. M. Bishop and A. O. Martin (Switzerland: Springer),
117–126.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Froese and Sierra. This is an open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution
or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or
licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in
accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is
permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org October 2015 | Volume 2 | Article 263
